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I follow Mr. Bailey, who was the rapporteur of the First Committee, which
dealt with seabed mining. As the Western member of the Bureau of the First
Committee, he had to consider concurrently the views of countries such as the
United States and Canada on this matter. This was certainly an unenviable
position.
It is important to bear in mind, because we and our friends in the West have
the tradition of speaking candidly to each other, that Mr. Bailey and the Austra-
lian delegation did not always agree with our government or our delegation. But
they were all friends of the United States. They did everything within their power
to use their considerable abilities, their good offices, and their well deserved repu-
tations to achieve compromise texts that were acceptable both to the United States
and to those with whom we disagreed. Indeed, Ambassador Malone's final state-
ment at the Law of the Sea Conference rightly praised the activities of Australia
and others in this regard.
I find myself on a panel with Mr. Dubs, a leading industry expert on deep
seabed mining who was beyond doubt one of the most influential and respected
industry representatives from any country at the Conference. (I hesitate to say
that Mr. Dubs was the most influential, because Mr. Dubs is one of the few who is
not a lawyer, but indeed the "client." Some might be tempted to think that that is
why he was so effective.)
As many of you know, I have read about deep seabed mining issues and I have
even written about them. But I am a neophyte on the underlying economic issues,
and that really is the nub of the question. It is a "nub" that I expect we are saving
for last and will hear from Mr. Dubs about. I needed the help of the authors just
to read the MIT studies that Mr. Bailey summarized so well. Therefore, if I have
anything to say myself on the future of deep seabed mining, it is as a lawyer.
Actually, since I am not representing anyone here, I am here more as a law pro-
fessor than as a lawyer. Not surprisingly, that is the problem, since everyone
knows that law professors' crystal balls are notoriously cloudy. These days it seems
only economists have the clarity of vision to assert (or at least imply) that the
difference between heeding and ignoring them is the difference between Nirvana
and Armageddon. My approach to this problem therefore is to be one of those
rare commentators at symposia of this sort who in fact really comments on what he
has just heard.
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Mr. Bailey said many interesting things. I heard him say that the nations that
ratify the Law of the Sea Convention will be prohibited from recognizing mining
rights asserted outside the Convention system. Many of us have read Article
137(3), on which he bases his conclusion. But as I listened, I remembered a com-
ment by Secretary of State Schultz that the parties to a treaty may not alter the
rights of nonparties under international law. All of us can appreciate the legal and
logical foundations on which the Secretary's statement rests. It seems we have a
dilemma. The Secretary of State declares that other people cannot alter our rights
without our consent. Mr. Bailey states that other people may be prohibited from
recognizing the existence of such rights.
Mr. Bailey and Secretary Schultz appear to have divergent views on the nature
of future state practice. This is, of course, the very heart of the matter if we are
undertaking a traditional analysis of the content of future customary international
law. Mr. Bailey just said that he was confident that when deep seabed mining
begins, it will take place under the regime established by the Law of the Sea Con-
vention. He believes only government subsidies, such as insurance or some other
form of subsidy, could compensate for the disadvantages of mining outside the
treaty system.
This morning Ambassador Malone stated, "There will not be investment in
seabed mining under the Law of the Sea Treaty unless governments are willing to
heavily subsidize the companies and mining entities." As I considered these
remarks, it occurred to me that if both Mr. Bailey and Ambassador Malone are
correct, then whatever the legal regime, deep seabed mining would appear to
require government subsidies. Quite clearly, each of them reaches his conclusion
because he believes a more attractive alternative for industry exists. They differ on
which is the more attractive alternative. On one level, the prospect of proponents
of alternative legal regimes for the seabed vying with each other to offer more
attractive deals to industry is not entirely unattractive to the investor. This is, of
course, true only so long as the proponents of the different regimes duel with
carrots.
The problem is that I think I saw Mr. Bailey bearing some sticks. I hope I am
wrong because if he was bearing sticks, it may be a regrettable and premature step
even from his own point of view. It is questionable policy to challenge the United
States to a shoot-out, as I am sure Mr. Bailey would agree. Moreover, if it is our
friends who are doing it, they may have something to lose whatever the outcome,
as I am sure Mr. Bailey would also agree.
In particular, one must question whether it is fair for nations, because of their
disapproval of the policies of the American government, to discriminate against
private American citizens and companies. There is solid support for the view that
a retaliatory taking of private property by a state is a violation of international
law. If the basic legal principle is that the deep seabeds are open to all without
discrimination-a principle that is basic to both the high seas regime and the
treaty regime-then what justification can there be to close it to people because of
disagreement with their government?
In contrast, Ambassador Malone rested his prediction on economic principles.
He said the system being offered miners under U.S. law is inherently superior to
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the regulatory regime under the treaty and will succeed for that reason. He rests
his case on a U.S. statute that asserts that everyone has a right to mine the deep
seabed. I did not hear him threaten to exclude treaty parties from that principle.
. It appears that Mr. Bailey is counting his chickens long before they are
hatched. Indeed, I am not even sure everyone sees as many eggs as he does. He
does have supporters for his point of view, but so does Ambassador Malone. A
major political or legal confrontation in that situation could only serve to divide
and weaken the already fragile instruments of legitimacy available to the interna-
tional community, whether they are international organizations, international
courts, or the traditional processes of international law. To give just one example,
I have serious doubts whether members of the Group of 77 would be able to
present the issue to the International Court of Justice in a manner that could be
answered without risking a deep division between Western and developing country
judges that might harm the Court.
The reality is that the issue is premature. Mr. Bailey's assumption that he can
lure many industrial states into ratifying the treaty is untested. I believe Mr.
Bailey's predictions will definitely not be realized unless rules and regulations that
substantially confine the thrust of the treaty regime on certain points are drafted
reasonably soon. The question is, will the Group of 77 and their supporters do
this?
Based on the experience so far, it is difficult to give an affirmative response.
After President Reagan publicly pledged that he would support a treaty modified
to accommodate his major concerns, the developing countries, particularly some
developing countries with no direct interest in opposing what the United States
was seeking, were not very forthcoming. Indeed they effectively, even if uninten-
tionally, precluded constructive discussion of the compromise efforts of Mr.
Bailey's own delegation-the so-called Group of 11 proposals-by attaching pro-
cedural conditions that they should have known could not be accepted by the U.S.
delegation or any other delegation in its position. Moreover, Mr. Bailey knows
that he nearly had agreement on a compromise on technology transfer that went
far toward accommodating Western concerns and was acceptable to the devel-
oping countries with an interest in the subject, a compromise that was blocked by
delegations from other developing countries whose economic ministries are
unlikely to be interested in deep seabed mining technology for decades to come.
I look back and rehearse all of this only for purposes of trying to predict what
action the Preparatory Commission is likely to take. In brief, if that was the
response to President Reagan, is there reason to believe that there will be a more
positive response to the technical delegations that may attend the Preparatory
Commission from Europe or Asia?
I have known Mr. Bailey for a long time. I have no doubt regarding his deter-
mination to press ahead. But for what it is worth, I offer him some advice. I
suggest he accept the competition in the open spirit of the free market. Perhaps
the Preparatory Commission can write rules and regulations that satisfy many, if
not all, of the concerns that are prevalent among investors in Western Europe and
Japan. Both those who believe in the free market and those who do not believe
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fully understand what companies will do if they are offered a more attractive
arrangement.
For my part, my crystal ball is too cloudy to predict the outcome. Even if it
were not, however, I would hesitate to do so. One of the things the world could use
right now is a little healthy competition in the direction of encouraging the kind of
climate needed for efficient production of natural resources in response to world
demand.
